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We consider a revenue-maximizing seller who, before proposing a mechanism to sell her
object(s), observes a vector of signals correlated with buyersvaluations. Each buyer knows only
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rst chooses how to disclose her information and then chooses a revenue-maximizing
mechanism. We allow for very general disclosure policies, that can be random, public, private,
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can create correlation in buyerstypes, which then consist of valuations plus beliefs. For the
standard independent private values model, we show that information revelation is irrelevant:
irrespective of the disclosure policy an optimal mechanism for this informed seller generates
expected revenue that is equal to her maximal revenue under full information disclosure. For
more general allocation environments that allow also for interdependent, for common values, and
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1. Introduction
The literature on revenue-maximizing auctions1 is a cornerstone of auction theory. A crucial as-
sumption in this literature is that the seller does not have any information that is unknown to the
buyers. However, this assumption often fails in practice: A seller typically has superior information
about how much objects are worth, and about participantswillingness to pay. In this paper, we
consider a seller2 that has superior information about participantswillingness to pay. As in the
work on revenue-maximizing auctions, the seller has the power to choose any auction to sell her
objects. However, here we also allow the seller to disclose information to the buyers before the
auction. We are interested in evaluating the impact of information disclosure on the revenue that
the seller can generate, and in characterizing optimal information disclosure policies.
A striking example of a seller having information about buyers that is superior to the one their
competitors have, is a sale of a company. A typical company sale includes a pre-auction stage where
prospective buyers submit to the seller non-binding bids as an expression of interest, (indicative
bidding). After indicative bidding, the seller knows a lot more about the various buyerswillingness
to pay than their competitors do. Based on these indicative bids, the seller screens who should take
part in the auction,3 and chooses a reservation price. Hansen (2001) suggests that these expressions
of interest are close to how much bidders are actually willing to pay.
Similar phenomena occur in block trading.4 Prior to sale, institutional investors submit in-
dications of interest, also known as IOI. IOI are very common and typically contain information
about how many shares, and at what price, the particular buyer is willing to purchase. Another
common instance where the seller may have information superior to the buyers is sales of real
estate. There, the seller typically observes how many times a buyer visits the house, how carefully
he examines everything, whether or not he comes to the house with his/her architect, and, as in
the case of company sales, preliminary statements about how much a buyer would be willing to
pay at the auction. All this information is correlated with a buyers willingness to pay. The seller
may then know more about a buyers competitors, than the buyer himself knows. The same can
be true when sales (or purchases) are repeated. Consider, for instance, purchases by government
agencies. In such situations, the government agency may have interacted in the past more often
with some of the bidders and, thus, have information about their costs that is superior to that of
the participants at the current auction.5
In this paper, we analyze the following problem. There is a risk-neutral seller who faces I
1The seminal papers are Myerson (1981) and Riley and Samuelson (1981).
2We use the female pronoun for the seller and male pronouns for the buyers.
3Given what we know from auction theory (see, for instance, Bulow and Klemperer (1996)) it may appear subop-
timal for a seller to want to screen out buyers. For a justication, see Hansen (2001) or Milgrom (2004).
4Trade of a large number of shares, usually traded o¤ the oor.
5However, we should mention that in practice, things may not be as simple as the description of the examples
in the last two paragraphs suggests, because the seller and the entity organizing the auction could di¤er. Then,
it is possible that the seller is controlling the pre-auction information disclosure phase, whereas an intermediary is
choosing the auction rules. It is also possible that the intermediary does both. So long as the objectives both of the
seller and the intermediary coincide and amount to revenue maximization, our analysis goes through.
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risk-neutral buyers whose willingness to pay depends on a single dimensional parameter vi that
is private information, but is distributed according to Fi; which is common knowledge. Valuation
parameters are independently distributed across buyers. The seller observes privately a vector of
signals s = (s1; :::; sI) one for each buyer. The vector of signals is taken to be exogenous6 and its
components are distributed independently from one another. Each buyer knows only the signal that
the seller has observed about him, but not the signals that the seller has observed about the others.
Signal si contains information about vi but not v i: At date 1, the seller maps her information to
one message for each buyer. We call this mapping information disclosure policy : We impose no
restriction on what the seller can report, and we allow the seller to make private or public reports
and to employ randomizations. At date 2, the seller proposes a revenue-maximizing mechanism to
sell her object(s).
This is an informed principal problem with multiple agents, with the additional step that
the principal (seller) can inuence the agents (buyers) perceptions about their competitors by
disclosing information. How can a seller put her information to best use? Broadly speaking,
the seller has three options: (1) no, (2) full, or, (3) some partial, possibly private, information
disclosure. Each of these alternatives has very di¤erent implications for what buyers know when
they are about to participate in the auction, which, in turn, may lead to big di¤erences in achievable
revenue. For example, when information disclosure is private, then, a buyers beliefs about another
buyer become part of his type since they depend on the information that is not publicly available,
and buyerstypes7 can become correlated, even though buyersinitial information was statistically
independent. Can the seller create correlations that allow her to reduce the buyers information
rents? Can she eliminate the distortions of incomplete information by using mechanisms of the
Cremer-McLean (1988) type? What is the optimal information disclosure policy, given that the
seller will be subsequently choosing an optimal mechanism? We address these questions in the
standard independent private value setup (IPV ); as well as in a general model that allows for
interdependent values, for common values, and for multiple goods.
6 In some of the examples mentioned earlier, indications of interest could be endogenous and could depend on
what the seller plans to do with the information once it is released. However, it is important to note that in many
situations, such as in company sales (which are one-time events), the information that the seller has about the possible
auction participants often comes from previous interactions with such entities (they are suppliers, subcontractors,
competitors) at points in time when the company sale was not anticipated. For those scenarios, which are quite
common in sales of private companies, our assumption about the information being exogenous is probably more
realistic than the reverse. The same is true in other situations, where the seller obtained information about various
participants in the auctions, at points in time when the auction was not anticipated. For instance, in the case of real
estate, the owner of a house may have heard some of her friends say how much they would be willing to pay for the
house, at some point in time when the owner herself was not considering selling it.
Clearly, though, there are situations where the assumption that the sellers information is exogenous is less realistic.
For these cases, our analysis is a partial-equilibrium one. With the given information in her hands, what is the best
the seller can do? The results and the method of analysis, can be incorporated in larger games where the information
released is endogenous, and it depends on what buyers anticipate that the seller will do in the future with the
information they release.
7Typesthen consist of valuations plus beliefs.
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What information disclosure policies are optimal is not clear a priori. A potential rationale for
no information revelation is that more information makes more deviations for the buyers feasible,
making, in some sense, the incentive constraints harder to satisfy.8 However, in quite a few in-
stances, the reverse is true, and full information disclosure is the optimal policy. This is the case,
for instance, in Milgrom and Weber (1982), who discover the celebrated linkage principle, and
in Es½o and Szentes (2006). Also, the possibility of private information revelation may be strictly
preferred to all public information disclosure policies. An environment where this can be true is
analyzed by Harstad and Mares (2003).
We show that when the seller has the ability to use her information to design optimal mech-
anisms, the scope of information disclosure is limited. In the standard IPV case, we have an
Information Irrelevance Theorem: Irrespective of the disclosure policy, an optimal mechanism gen-
erates expected revenue that is equal to her revenue under full information disclosure. This is
despite the fact that the seller can create correlation in buyerstypes,9 and is in contrast to what
happens with exogenously xed auction rules, where the belief-relevant part of type has a signif-
icant impact on equilibrium behavior. This is demonstrated in Bergemann and Välimäki (2006).
However, for general auction design problems, the sellers expected revenue can depend on which
disclosure policy she employs. Then, the question that arises is which one is best. In response to
this question, we show that the best information disclosure policy is to release no information at
all. This nding may be somewhat surprising, given that we allow for interdependent values, which
is also the case in Milgrom and Weber (1982), who prove the opposite result. However, there are
two important di¤erences between Milgrom and Weber (1982) and this paper. In Milgrom and
Weber (1982), the auction rules are xed, and the buyers(prior) information is a¢ liated. Here,
the seller can choose the auction she uses, and the prior information that buyers have is statistically
independent.
There are three main forces behind our results. First, disclosure policies, irrespective of how
sophisticated they are, essentially have no impact on a buyers information rents. The reason for
this is that a buyer can still mimicthe behavior of the same set of valuations, as in the case where
all the information that the seller has is public. Moreover, the expected payments that a seller can
extract from selling buyers (agents) information about their competitors are always equal to
zero. This is because there is a common prior and all players form posteriors using Bayesrule,
which implies that the side contracts written between the seller and a buyer that have positive
expected value for the seller have negative expected value for the buyer. Thus, they are never
accepted. The second force is that the sellers incentive constraints are not binding. This happens
because the sellers information is non-exclusive: What she knows about a buyer, is also known to
that particular buyer himself. The third force is related to how disclosure policies a¤ect the set
of incentive-compatible mechanisms. In the case of independent private values, disclosure policies
do not enlarge the set of incentive-compatible mechanisms in any relevant way. The reason is
8Myerson (1986) studied an environment where this reasoning applies.
9A by-product of our analysis is that unless the seller observes information that tells her exactly what the valuation
of a buyer is, full surplus extraction is not possible, irrespective of how sophisticated her disclosure policies are.
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that in the IPV case, even when beliefs are part of buyerstypes, an optimal Bayesian incentive
compatible mechanism is also dominant strategy incentive compatible. This is not true in general,
however. In general, disclosure policies a¤ect the set of incentive-compatible mechanisms, which
becomes largest when the seller discloses no information at all. This is why, in the general case, the
best that the seller can do is to disclose no information at all. We now give a more comprehensive
account of some related work.
1.1 Related Literature
This paper is related to the work on mechanism design by an informed principal.10 The rst
paper in this literature is Myerson (1983), which formulates the important idea of inscrutable
mechanisms. Two other seminal contributions are Maskin and Tirole (1990) and (1992). Other
than Myerson (1983), two papers allow for multiple agents: Tisljar (2003), under the restriction
that buyers do not have private information, and Mylovanov (2005), which examines a private value
quasilinear environment. In all the aforementioned papers, the principals information pertains to
his/her preferences and is exclusive. In this paper, the seller has information that is not commonly
known, but each buyer knows the information that the seller has about himself; hence, the sellers
information is non-exclusive.
Even though our informed seller problem (both in the baseline IPV case, and in the general case)
falls in the common value category, CVInformed_Principal;11 it has a private value, PVInformed_Principal; 12
avor in that the seller can always achieve her complete information13 payo¤.14 Also, in our general
model, the informed principal can do strictly better than an uninformed one, even though we are
in a quasilinear setup. This is because the sellers private information relaxes the buyersincentive
constraints. This nding is in contrast to the analysis of Maskin and Tirole (1990) and Mylo-
vanov (2005), who consider PVInformed_Principal environments and show that in the quasilinear case,
the principal is indi¤erent between having private information and not. Finally, in our informed
principal problem, the principals information is correlated with the information of the agents.
This is also the case in Cella (2007), who considers a single-agent, PVInformed_Principal; quasilinear
environment, whereas, in this paper, the informed principal is sometimes strictly better o¤ than
an uninformed one. The forces present are di¤erent, however, since in our setup the asymmetric
10There are also papers that study the choices of an informed seller within specic classes of mechanisms. See, for
instance Cai, Riley and Yi (2007) and Jullien and Mariotti (2006).
11 In the terminology of Maskin and Tirole (1990) and (1992), in the common value case, the principals private
information enters in the agents payo¤ function not only though the mechanism, but also in other ways, either
directly or by a¤ecting the agents beliefs. In the case of private values, the principals information enters only
through the mechanism.
12We call the private value case PVIn form ed_Principal to stress that the term private values refers to how the
principals information a¤ects the agentspayo¤s, and that this notion is completely distinct from the notion of the
IPV setting.
13Here, we follow Maskin and Tirole (1990) and call complete informationthe case where there is no uncertainty
about the principal, even though the agent can have private information.
14This is because the principal can always achieve her complete information maximal payo¤ in a PVIn form ed_Principal
environment, but not in a CVIn form ed_Principal environment (Maskin and Tirole (1992)).
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information between the buyers and the seller appears only if there is more than one buyer.
This paper is also related to the literature on mechanism design with endogenous types.15 In
Obara (2008), agentstypes are endogenous and are determined by actions agents choose before
participating in the mechanism. He investigates under which circumstances the actions chosen
generate an environment where the designer can extract full surplus from the agents. In the papers
by Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007), Es½o and Szentes (2007), Ganuza (2004) and Ganuza and
Penalva (2006), the endogeneity of information is directly controlled by the mechanism designer, or
the seller. More specically, the seller controls the technology that generates the value estimates for
the buyers. Valuations are private, but in order for a buyer to assess how much the good is worth
to him, he must receive information from the seller. Those papers consider such problems under
di¤erent assumptions about the sellers technology to inuence valuations. With the exception of
Es½o and Szentes (2007),16 in those papers, at an optimum, the seller discloses less information
than is e¢ cient: More information increases e¢ ciency, which has a positive e¤ect on revenue, but
also increases information rents, which has a negative e¤ect on revenue. Unlike these papers, in
this paper, for the case of private values, buyers know their valuations, and the seller inuences the
belief-relevant part of their type. Another di¤erence is that this paper also examines interdependent
and common value environments. Moreover, here, the sellers information is private. Our question
is not how the seller can best inuence the buyersown estimates in order to boost revenue, as is
the focus of Bergemann and Pesendorfer (2007), Ganuza (2004), and Es½o and Szentes (2007), but,
rather, how the seller can inuence a buyers perceptions about his competitors in order to increase
revenue.
Our ndings are intimately related to the recent work on mechanism design with statistically
correlated information by Neeman (2004), and by Heifetz and Neeman (2006). The classic papers
in that literature (Cremer and McLean (1988), and McAfee and Reny (1992)) establish that when
agents are risk-neutral, even an arbitrarily small correlation in types renders private information
worthless and allows the designer to extract full surplus. In those papers, a type of an agent consists
of a parameter that a¤ects payo¤s. In this paper, full surplus extraction is typically not possible,
because, as in Neeman (2004) and Heifetz and Neeman (2006), beliefs are also part of the types.
When this is the case, typically, there are many valuations that have the same beliefs; therefore,
the knowledge of beliefs does not make the exact inference of valuations possible.
This work relates also to the large literature on information revelation in auctions. Perry and
Reny (1999) show that the linkage principle of Milgrom and Weber (1982) may fail when there
are multiple objects. Ottaviani and Prat (2001) show that the linkage principle holds in a non-
15For an excellent survey of this topic, as well as of other important topics about information in mechanism design,
see Bergemann and Välimäki (2006).
16Es½o and Szentes (2007) show that the ine¢ ciency created by having too little information, can be eliminated by
allowing the seller to charge a fee for the information she provides. In that paper, the seller simultaneously chooses
the mechanism and how much information to disclose. Then, her incentives to disclose information are completely
aligned with e¢ ciency because her rents are tied to how big the pie will be. They establish that an optimal disclosure
policy for the seller is to provide as much information as possible.
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linear pricing model where the monopolist rst discloses information and then chooses an optimal
schedule. Recently, Board (2006) allows for the possibility that information released changes the
winner and shows that, in this case, the linkage principal fails when the number of buyers is two.
With the exception of Ottaviani and Prat (2001), the aforementioned papers examine the e¤ect
of information disclosure for a given auction procedure.17 Also, by contrast with these papers,
where buyersinformation is a¢ liated, in this paper, the buyersinitial information is statistically
independent.
Initial information is also statistically independent in Landsberger, Rubinstein, Zamir and Wolf-
stetter (2001), and in Kaplan and Zamir (2002). Landsberger, Rubinstein, Zamir and Wolfstetter
(2001) show that when the seller knows the ranking of buyersvaluations and she makes it common
knowledge, a rst-price auction raises higher revenue than in the case where the seller does not
disclose this information. Kaplan and Zamir (2002) also consider information revelation in rst-
price auctions, but allow for more general public disclosure policies than Landsberger, Rubinstein,
Zamir and Wolfstetter (2001) allow. There are three main di¤erences between our paper and these.
First, in Landsberger, Rubinstein, Zamir and Wolfstetter (2001) and Kaplan and Zamir (2002)
the information that the seller receives is correlated across buyers. Because of this correlation,
information disclosure creates a correlation in the payo¤-relevant part of types, their valuations.
Second, in those papers, information disclosure is public, whereas we allow the seller to employ
public as well as, private disclosure policies. Finally, they consider rst price auctions, whereas our
seller designs revenue-maximizing mechanisms.
The remainder of this paper is structured as follows. Section 2 describes the environment and the
main denitions used in the analysis. Section 3 contains the analysis of the information disclosure
and mechanism selection problem in the standard independent private value case and establishes
the information irrelevance theorem. Section 4 contains a brief description of the general model
and establishes the no-disclosure result. We nish with a brief summary and some nal remarks in
Section 5. Proofs not found in the main text are in Appendix A.
2. The Environment and Main Definitions
A risk-neutral seller, indexed by 0, owns a unit of an indivisible object, and faces I risk-neutral
buyers. The sellers valuation for the object is zero, whereas that of buyer i is distributed on a set
Vi = [ai; bi] according to a continuous, and strictly positive density fi.18 A buyers valuation vi is
private and independently distributed across buyers. We use f(v) = i2Ifi(vi); where v 2 V =
i2IVi and f i(v i) = j2I
j 6=i
fj(vj).
The timing of the game is as follows:
17A somewhat intermediate approach is seen in Kremer and Skrzypacz (2004). There, the release of information
from the seller is through which standardauction procedure she chooses.
18Our results go through when the priors Fi are discrete or mixed measures. In such cases, the analysis can proceed
essentially using techniques described in Skreta (2007). Further details are available from the author upon request.
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 At date 1, the seller observes privately a vector of signals s = (s1; :::; sI) and maps it (possibly
randomly) to a vector of messages m = (m1; :::;mI); one for each buyer.
 At date 2, the seller chooses an auction procedure to sell the object. Date 2 has three stages.
At stage one, the mechanism is proposed and at stage two, the buyers accept or reject the
mechanism. If they all accept, the mechanism is played at stage three; otherwise, buyers get
their outside option, which is 0, and the seller keeps the good.
Date 1 captures some previous interaction between the seller and the buyers, such as a previous
auction, or some other process, such as the indicative bidding stage in the sales of private companies
or the IOIs in block trading. On Date 2, the auction procedure is chosen and carried out. We now
proceed to give a more detailed account of the sellers information, how she maps it to messages to
the buyers, and the e¤ect of this information disclosure on the buyersand the sellers types.
Sellers Information: The vector of signals s is taken to be exogenous. We use Si to denote
the set of signals that the seller can observe about buyer i: S  i2ISi to denote the set of vectors
of signals about all buyers, and S i = i2ISi to denote the set of vectors of signals about all
buyers, but i: For simplicity, we take the set Si to be nite. No result, however, hinges on this
simplication. Let i(si) denote the probability that the seller observes signal si about i; i 2 I:
These probabilities are common knowledge. We assume that sis are independently distributed
from one another and use (s) = i2Ii(si) to denote the joint distribution. Each signal si is
potentially informative about buyer is valuation, vi; but it does not contain any information about
vj for j 6= i: The posterior of vi conditional on si is denoted by fi(vi jsi ), which is assumed to be
strictly positive and continuous on Vi(si) = [vi(si); vi(si)]; where vi(si) and vi(si) are respectively
the lowest and highest valuations in the support of fi(vi jsi ):19 Each buyer knows only the signal
the seller has observed about himself (si); but not the ones that the seller has observed about the
other buyers, the s is. For our results here, as well as in the more general model considered later,
it does not make any di¤erence whether the sellers information is veriable or not.
Information Disclosure: The part of the sellers strategy that species the relationship be-
tween what she knows and what she reports to the buyers is called an information disclosure policy.
More formally, an information disclosure policy is a mapping from the vector of signals observed by
the seller to a vector of messages, one for each buyer, that is, c : S ! (M); whereM := i2IMi;
and where Mi is the set of messages that the seller can send to buyer i: The vector of messages
revealed is m = (m1;m2; :::;mI); with mi 2 Mi; i 2 I: With a slight abuse of notation, we use
c(m js) to denote the probability that the disclosure policy reveals m given s: The disclosure policy
is common knowledge, but each buyer observes only mi:20
19This assumption is not essential. Our results go through when the posteriors Fi(:jsi) are discrete or mixed
measures. Further details are available from the author upon request.
20At an equilibrium, this map is understood by all. Alternatively, we could have the seller choose the mapping c
before she sees s: For our analysis, this di¤erence turns out to be immaterial.
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Types: A type of a player consists of whatever he knows, that is not common knowledge. Here,
both the buyers and the seller have private information. Buyer is beliefs about j are determined
from the prior and the disclosure policy conditional on si and mi: Because si and mi are privately
observed, is beliefs about  i are not known to the other buyers and they become part of buyer is
type. Hence, buyer is type consists of a payo¤-relevant part, vi; and a belief-relevant part, si;mi:21
The set of types of buyer i is denoted by Vi(Si)  Si Mi(Si); and it consists of triplets of the
form vi; si;mi; where vi 2 Vi(si) and mi 2 Mi(si); for si 2 Si; where a message mi is in Mi(si)
if c(mi; ~m i jsi; ~s i ) > 0; for some ~s i 2 S i and ~m i 2 M i:22 The set of types for the seller is
denoted by S M(S); and it consists of vectors (s;m); where s 2 S and m 2 M(s); and where
the setM(s) contains all messages that satisfy c(m js) > 0: A type prole is given by 
vi; si;mi| {z }
buyer i
;
v i; s i;m i| {z }
buyers  i
;
si; s i;mi;m i| {z }
seller
!
;
which for convenience is summarized as (v; s;m): The set of all type proles is denoted by V (S)
S M(S):
Information Disclosure Policies & Types - Examples: In the case of a disclosure policy
that is fully revealing, everyone has observed the same amount of information, and the sellers and
buyer is beliefs about buyers  i coincide and are common knowledge. In this case, buyer is type
consists merely of vi: In the case of no information revelation, buyer is posterior about  i is equal
to the prior. In that case, is type is the couple vi; si; since both vi and si are known to i but not
to other buyers: For other disclosure policies, is type is the triplet vi; si;mi:
Disclosure Policy Type of buyer i
fully revealing: mi = s; for all i and s 2 S vi
no information revelation: mi = ;; for all i vi; si
partial information revelation: mi =
(
s i w. pr 0.5
s^ i w. pr 0.5
vi; si;mi
Mechanism Selection Stage: Our seller here is informed, so formally, the problem of mech-
anism selection at date 2 belongs in the class of informed principal problems and is modeled as a
three-stage game between a principal (seller) and the agents (buyers).23 At stage 3, the beliefs of
the agents are updated to account for what they infer from the mechanism that the principal pro-
posed at stage one. Also, the principal updates her beliefs about the agentstypes after observing
21Note that si is part of i0s type because it is known to i; but not to  i:
22The setMi(si) contains all the messages that buyer i receives with strictly positive probability, when the signal
that the seller has observed about him is si:
23See Maskin and Tirole (1990) and (1992).
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that they all participated. Obviously, this kind of game can have a plethora of equilibria. Moreover,
its analysis can be quite challenging. We follow an indirect approach, which is possible because
of the beautiful insights from the path-breaking papers of Myerson (1983) and Maskin and Tirole
(1990 and 1992). Once we are done with our somewhat reduced form analysis,we argue why the
allocations we obtain correspond to equilibrium allocations of the three-stage game. However, we
will not be very explicit about all the details that are similar to the ones in the previous literature.
Lets start by abstracting, for the moment, from who has the power to choose the mechanism.
By the revelation principle24 we can obtain all the equilibrium-feasible allocations arising from
arbitrary games, by looking at equilibrium allocations of direct revelation mechanisms, that satisfy
incentive, IC, participation, PC; and resource constraints, RES, for all buyers and the seller. As
usual, the seller and buyers send their reports simultaneously in the mechanism.
A direct revelation mechanism, (DRM); M = (p; x) consists of an assignment rule p : V (S)
SM(S)  ! (I) and a payment rule x : V (S)SM(S)  ! RI . The assignment rule species
a probability distribution over the set of buyers given a vector of reports. We denote by pi(v; s;m)
the probability that i obtains the good when the vector of reports is v; s;m. Similarly; xi(v; s;m)
denotes the expected payment incurred by i; given v; s;m:
What makes an informed principal problem special, is precisely the fact that the person in charge
of choosing (p; x) has private information. One consequence of that is that the seller must be also
submitting reports in the mechanism. However, the most important implication, is that the choice
of the schedule (p; x) itself can reveal information to the buyers about the sellers information. This
can happen because di¤erent types of the seller may prefer di¤erent (p; x)s:25 This information
release changes the buyersbeliefs, and in order for (p; x) to be feasible, it must satisfy the incentive
and the participation constraints of the buyers with respect to their posterior beliefs, obtained after
they see the mechanism chosen by the seller. The inscrutability principle due to Myerson (1983)
argues that it is without any loss to restrict attention to incentive-feasible allocations, where all
types of the individual in charge of choosing the mechanism, (the seller in our case), choose the
same schedule. Then, the choice of the schedule itself does not reveal any additional information.
Fix an information disclosure policy c and consider a DRM p and x; (revelation principle).
By the inscrutability principle, all types of the seller choose the same (p; x); which implies that
after being confronted with (p; x); the buyersbeliefs about the sellers type do not change (the
mechanism (p; x) does not release any new information). Let
ui(v; s;m) = pi(v; s;m)vi   xi(v; s;m); (1)
denote buyer is payo¤ given a mechanism (p; x) when the realized types are summarized to v; s;m,
and all report truthfully:We let Pi(vi; si;mi) = Ev i;s i;m i [pi(v; s;m) jsi;mi ] denote the expected
probability that i obtains the good, and Xi(vi; si;mi) = Ev i;s i;m i [xi(v; s;m) jsi;mi ] denote the
24See, for instance, Myerson (1979) or Myerson (1981).
25Related to this point, Yilankaya (1999) shows in a bilateral trade setting that (holding the beliefs of the buyer
constant) some types of the seller prefer a double auction, whereas other types prefer a posted price. At an optimum,
however, the buyer understands which types of the seller prefer the double auction, which overturns its optimality.
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expected payment that he incurs, when his type is vi; si;mi and when all other buyers and the seller
report truthfully. These expectations are conditioned only on si and mi; and not on vi because
valuations are independently distributed, which immediately implies that vi does not contain any
information about v i: Also, since the disclosure policy maps S to M, vi does not contain any
additional information for m i and s i: The expected payo¤ of type vi; si;mi of buyer i at a
truth-telling equilibrium of a direct revelation mechanism is given by
Ui(vi; si;mi)  Ev i;s i;m i [ui(v; s;m) jsi;mi ] = Pi(vi; si;mi)vi  Xi(vi; si;mi):
A mechanism is feasible if and only if it satises the following incentive (IC); participation
(PC) and resource (RES) constraints. The constraints for the seller are given by
IC0:
R
V (s)i2Im2Mc(m js)xi(v; s;m)f(v js)dv 
R
V (s)i2Im2Mc(m js)xi(v; s^; m^)f(v js)dv;
for all (s;m); (s^; m^) 2 S M(S)
PC0:
R
V (s)i2Im2Mc(m js)xi(v; s;m)f(v js)dv  0; for all (s;m); (s^; m^) 2 S 
M(S):
The constraints for each buyer i, with i 2 I; are given by:
ICi: Ui(vi; si;mi)  Pi(v^i; s^i; m^i)vi   Xi(v^i; s^i; m^i), for all (vi; si;mi); (v^i; s^i; m^i) 2
Vi(Si) Si Mi(Si):
PCi: Ui(vi; si;mi)  0; for all (vi; si;mi) 2 Vi(Si) Si Mi(Si):
Resource Constraints are given by
RES : pi(v; s;m) 2 [0; 1] and i2Ipi(v; s;m)  1; for all (v; s;m) 2 V (S)SM(S):
Before we proceed to investigate the consequences of these constraints, a few remarks are in
order. In terms of the sellers incentive constraints, rst note that, because we are analyzing
mechanism selection after the information disclosure stage has taken place, the sellers reports
enter only the mechanism and not the disclosure policy. This is because, at the point where the
mechanism is chosen, the seller has already observed s and disclosed information according to c:
More importantly, since the sellers information is non-exclusive any deviations from the seller can
be immediately detected when all the buyers report truthfully. However, since we do not a priori
know from which side it is easier to elicit the non-exclusive information, namely the s;m; we write
the constraints as if all information is exclusive. This implies that we also allow each buyer to
misreport about all components of his type. Obviously, when i lies about si or about mi; the seller
can immediately detect this; nevertheless, these are possible deviations and we include them for
completeness. Notice, however, that we do not allow the buyers and the seller to make reports that
are incompatible with c: It is easy to see that such kinds of misreportings are easily detectable and,
thus, immaterial.
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Summarizing, we are considering a problem where the mechanism designer has private infor-
mation that is correlated with buyerswillingness to pay. This information can be used to a¤ect
buyerstypes by a¤ecting their beliefs about each other. Types then become correlated, since dif-
ferent types of a buyer have di¤erent beliefs about the types of the other buyers. Our objective is to
evaluate the role of information disclosure on the performance of revenue-maximizing mechanisms
that are chosen at date 2. The next section contains the analysis of this problem in the standard
IPV case.
3. Optimal Information Disclosure & Mechanism Selection in the Standard IPV
Case: An Information Irrelevance Theorem
In this section we analyze the information disclosure and mechanism selection problem in the
standard independent private value case and establish the information irrelevance theorem. Before
we begin the general analysis of the problem, we present an example that illustrates the main forces
behind the information irrelevance result.
3.1 A Motivating Example
Suppose that there two bidders, whose valuations are drawn from the uniform distribution on
[0; 1]. The seller can either observe a low (L) or a high (H) signal about each buyer. If a buyers
valuation falls in [0; 0:5]; the seller observes L; otherwise, she observes H: Then, her posterior after
observing L for a buyer is that this buyers valuation is uniformly distributed on [0; 0:5]; and her
corresponding posterior after observing H is the uniform distribution on [0:5; 1]:
Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms under Full Disclosure: If the seller discloses all her
information fully and truthfully, then a buyers and the sellers beliefs about the other buyer coincide
and are common knowledge. Suppose, for instance, that the seller has observed L for both buyers,
that is, s1 = L and s2 = L: Then, when the seller employs the full disclosure policy, she sends
m1 = L and m2 = L with probability one to each buyer. Using standard arguments (see Myerson
(1981)) the sellers expected revenue when s1 = L and s2 = L can be written asZ 0:5
0
Z 0:5
0
[p1(v1; v2; L; L; L; L)(2v1   0:5) + p2(v1; v2; L; L; L; L)(2v2   0:5)] 1
0:5
dv1
1
0:5
dv2
 U1(0)  U2(0);
where U i stands for the expected payo¤ of buyer i when his valuation is equal to its lowest possible
value. As is well known, the best the seller can do is to assign the object with probability one to
the buyer with the highest virtual valuation, so long as his valuation is above 0.25, and to keep the
object otherwise. This assignment rule guarantees that the last two terms are identically equal to
zero. Similarly, when the seller observes s1 = H and s2 = H her expected revenue can be written
12
as Z 1
0:5
Z 1
0:5
[p1(v1; v2;H;H;H;H)(2v1   1) + p2(v1; v2;H;H;H;H)(2v2   1)] 1
0:5
dv1
1
0:5
dv2
 U1(0:5)  U2(0:5):
In this case, the best for the seller is to assign the object with probability one to the buyer with the
highest valuation, so long as his valuation is above 0.75, and to keep the object otherwise. Finally,
when the seller observes a high signal for one of the buyers and a low signal for the other one - say,
for instance, s1 = H and s2 = L - then the sellers expected revenue can be written asZ 0:5
0
Z 1
0:5
[p1(v1; v2;H; L; L;H)(2v1   1) + p2(v1; v2;H; L; L;H)(2v2   0:5)] 1
0:5
dv1
1
0:5
dv2
 U1(0:5)  U2(0):
In this case the best for the seller is to assign the object with probability one to buyer 1 if v1 
v2+0:5, to buyer 2 if v2  v1 0:5 and v2  0:25, and to keep the object otherwise. By exchanging
1 and 2, we get the optimal auction outcome when the seller observes the low signal for buyer 1
and the high signal for buyer 2.
The assignment rule we described is the best that the seller can achieve given full disclosure
because it maximizes her revenue in all possible scenarios, (LL;HH;HL and LH). We now argue
that this schedule is feasible under full disclosure and, hence, is a solution to the sellers problem.
Actually, we argue something stronger, namely that it is feasible for all disclosure policies. First, it
is easy to see (following exactly the arguments in Myerson (1981)) that this schedule is dominant
strategy incentive compatible and it satises voluntary participation constraints for the buyers
irrespective of their beliefs, which implies that it satises the constraints for the buyers for all
disclosure policies. Second, the schedule is feasible for the seller - if the seller misreports, it would be
as if she were picking a p1 and p2 that maximize a wrong objective function. Also, by construction,
this allocation rule guarantees the seller a payo¤that is greater or equal to her value, hence satisfying
the sellers participation constraints. Since the sellers objective function depends only on s and
not on anything that can be a¤ected by the disclosure policy, the same arguments show that
the described allocation rule satises the sellers constraints irrespective of the disclosure policy.
The fact that the optimal mechanism under full disclosure is feasible for all disclosure policies
(together with the reasons behind this result that we just explained) is one of the main forces of
our information irrelevance theorem.
Revenue-Maximizing Mechanisms under Alternative Disclosure Policies: Suppose,
that the seller employs a disclosure policy other than full information disclosure. Then, the sellers
and buyer is beliefs about js valuation di¤er, and the standard arguments used in obtaining an
expression of the sellers revenue as a function of the allocation rule have to be modied. Below, we
show that for disclosure policies c; other than the full disclosure policy, the sellers revenue when
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she has observed signals, say s = (L;L); and has released messages (m1;m2) is given byZ 0:5
0
Z 0:5
0
[p1(v1; v2; L; L;m1;m2)(2v1   0:5) + p2(v1; v2; L; L;m1;m2)(2v2   0:5)] 1
0:5
dv1
1
0:5
dv2
 U1(0; L; L;m1;m2)  U2(0; L; L;m1;m2)
+
Z 0:5
0
Z 0:5
0
[1(v; L; L;m1;m2) + 2(v; L; L;m1;m2)]
1
0:5
dv1
1
0:5
dv2:
This expression di¤ers from the one under full disclosure in the extra two terms at the end. We
refer to these terms as information premia or side-payments, to capture that they come from the
fact that now that there is possibly some discrepancy between the sellers and the buyersbeliefs,
the seller can use the fact that she has superior information about a buyers opponent to extract
higher payments.
In the general analysis below, we argue that for all feasible mechanisms, given some disclosure
policy c; it must be the case that the ex-ante expected sum of the information premia must be zero,
that is
0:25
Z 0:5
0
Z 0:5
0
c(mjL;L) [1(v; L; L;m1;m2) + 2(v; L; L;m1;m2)] 1
0:5
dv1
1
0:5
dv2
+0:25
Z 1
0:5
Z 1
0:5
c(mjH;H) [1(v;H;H;m1;m2) + 2(v;H;H;m1;m2)] 1
0:5
dv1
1
0:5
dv2
+0:25
Z 1
0:5
Z 0:5
0
c(mjL;H) [1(v; L;H;m1;m2) + 2(v; L;H;m1;m2)] 1
0:5
dv1
1
0:5
dv2
+0:25
Z 0:5
0
Z 1
0:5
c(mjH;L) [1(v;H;L;m1;m2) + 2(v;H;L;m1;m2)] 1
0:5
dv1
1
0:5
dv2
= 0:
This result, as we explain in detail later, is a consequence of the incentive-compatibility con-
straints for the buyers, together with the fact that in our model there is a common prior and both
the seller and the buyers use Bayes rule to update their information. Now recall that we have
argued that the optimal mechanism under full disclosure is feasible for all disclosure policies. This
implies that the informed seller can always achieve her payo¤under full disclosure. The fact that for
all feasible mechanisms the ex-ante expected sum of the information premia must be zero, together
with the fact that the informed seller can always achieve her payo¤ under full disclosure, implies
1(v; s;m)+2(v; s;m) = 0 for all s and m for all feasible mechanisms, given some disclosure policy
c: Hence, we can safely ignore the extra terms of the information premium.
Given that we can now ignore the terms on information premium, the sellers revenue when she
has observed L;L is given by
Z 0:5
0
Z 0:5
0
[p1(v1; v2; L; L;m1;m2)(2v1   0:5) + p2(v1; v2; L; L;m1;m2)(2v2   0:5)] 1
0:5
dv1
1
0:5
dv2
 U1(0; L; L;m1;m2)  U2(0; L; L;m1;m2);
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which, apart from the fact that we now have some arbitrary messages m1;m2 entering p1 and p2
instead of L;L; is the same expression as the sellers revenue under full disclosure.26 The same is
true, of course, when the seller has observed H;H; H;L and L;H: Hence, the schedule that we
have derived as a solution when the seller employs the information disclosure policy, is a solution
for every disclosure policy.
This example illustrates the main results (and the forces behind them) that lead to the informa-
tion irrelevance theorem that we are about to prove. The rst result is that the optimal mechanism
under full disclosure is feasible for the informed sellers problem; in fact, it is feasible for all dis-
closure policies. The second result is that information premia for each type of the seller must be
indentically equal to zero. These two results imply that the informed seller will do best by using
a mechanism that maximizes the allocation-dependent part of her revenue. The solution of this
problem coincides with the optimal mechanism under full disclosure irrespective of the disclosure
policy employed by the seller at date 1.
Information Disclosure & Other Mechanisms
It is interesting to compare the e¤ect of information disclosure when the seller employs optimal
mechanisms, with cases where the seller employs specic auctions, such as a second-price or a
rst-price auction. First, note that the e¤ect of information disclosure on any kind of auction
procedure that has a dominant strategy equilibrium (such as a second-price auction (SPA)) is
nil. (The same is true for the e¤ect of information disclosure on the collusiveequilibrium of the
SPA where all buyers, but one, bid zero - this is still an equilibrium regardless of what buyers
know about their competitors.) Then, one needs to consider other auction procedures that have
Bayes-Nash equilibria that are a¤ected by the sellers information disclosure, such as a rst-price
auction (FPA). Now we compare the e¤ect of two extreme disclosure policies, full disclosure and
no disclosure, on the equilibria of rst-price auctions and show that, there, information disclosure
matters.
Equilibrium of First-Price Auction under No Disclosure: When the seller discloses no
information to the buyers before they bid in an FPA; at the point where they choose their bidding
functions, it is common knowledge that each buyer views his competitor as having a valuation
drawn from the uniform distribution on [0; 1]: In this case, there is a symmetric equilibrium where
both buyers bid according to:
b(v) =
v
2
for v 2 [0; 0:5]:
In this equilibrium, the bidder with the highest realized valuation wins the object and pays a price
that is equal to half his value.
Equilibrium of First-Price Auction under Full Disclosure: Here, depending on what
the seller has observed (which determines what she discloses), there are four scenarios to consider.
26They also enter the expressions of U i because these terms depend on the p
0
is; but this is immaterial because once
the p0is are chosen optimally, these terms turn out to be zero.
15
1. Seller observed L;L : In this case, under full disclosure it is common knowledge that each
buyer views his competitor as having a valuation drawn from the uniform distribution on [0; 0:5]: In
this case, too, there is a symmetric equilibrium where both buyers use the following bid function:
b(v) =
v
2
for v 2 [0; 0:5]:
In this equilibrium, the bidder with the highest realized valuation wins the object and pays a price
that is equal to half his value.
2. Seller observed H;H : In this case, under full disclosure it is common knowledge that each
buyer views his competitor as having a valuation drawn from the uniform distribution on [0:5; 1]:
There is a symmetric equilibrium where both buyers use the following bid function:
b(v) =
v
2
+
0:25
2v
for v 2 [0; 0:5]:27
In this equilibrium, the bidder with the highest realized valuation wins the object (bidding strategies
are strictly increasing on (0:5; 1]).
3. Seller observed L;H (analogously H;L) : In this case, it is common knowledge that
buyer 1 knows that buyer 2 believes that v1 is uniformly distributed on [0; 0:5]: It is also common
knowledge that buyer 2 knows that buyer 1 believes that v2 is uniformly distributed on [0:5; 1]:
Here, we have to calculate the equilibrium of an asymmetric rst-price auction, where buyer 1s
valuation is drawn from the uniform distribution on [0; 0:5] and buyer 2s valuation is drawn from
the uniform distribution on [0:5; 1]: Using the results of Kaplan and Zamir (2007)28, we obtain the
following inverse bid functions:
v1(b) =
0:25
2:0  2:529 (0:5  2b) e 0:50:5 2b   4b
v2(b) = 0:5 +
0:25
 4b  1:581 6 (0:5  2b) e  0:50:5 2b
:
27The general formula for the bidding functions is given by b(v) = v   R v
v
Fn 1(w)dw=Fn 1(v) for all v 2 (v; v]
and b(v) has support fno bid,vg: See Lebrun (1999), Corollary 3.
28The general formulas of the inverse bidding functions for environments that include this example (two bidders,
uniform distributions with di¤erent supports) are described in Proposition 1 in Kaplan and Zamir (2007).
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The bid functions are depicted in Figure 1:
Bid Functions: Asymmetric Case
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Figure 1
A quick look at the bid functions reveals that, in this case, the equilibrium is ine¢ cient.29
From this example, one can see that whether the seller discloses none or all of her information
has a dramatic e¤ect on the equilibrium bid functions and allocations of a rst-price auction. In
the case of no disclosure, the equilibrium is e¢ cient because the highest bidder wins. In the case
of full disclosure, the equilibrium depends on the signals that the seller has observed. When she
observes the same signal for both buyers, equilibria are e¢ cient, but when she observes di¤erent
signals they are not. In contrast, as we discussed earlier, information disclosure a¤ects neither the
outcome nor the buyersand the sellers payo¤ of an optimal mechanism.
3.2 General Analysis
In this subsection, we establish the information irrelevance theorem. Before we do so, we outline
the main steps we follow. We start by deriving necessary conditions for menus p; x that satisfy the
constraints for the buyers. Then, for a given disclosure policy c; we consider a program that ignores
the sellers constraints and where each type of the seller chooses the mechanism that maximizes
the allocation-dependent part of revenue, ignoring the information premium. We call this problem
Program S: We proceed to argue that a solution to Program S p; x is feasible for the mechanism
selection stage for the given disclosure policy. Then, using this nding, as well as implications
of the feasibility constraints for the buyers, we establish that, at a solution of the informed seller
problem, the information premium must be equal to zero for each type of the seller. Hence, even
29Note that buyer 1 does not submit a bid if his valuation is below 0.2604, which is roughly equal to the smallest
bid submitted by buyer 2 (buyer 2 bids 0.26 when his valuation is 0.5).
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though the schedule p; x is derived so as to maximize the allocation-dependent part of revenue,
it turns out that it maximizes all terms (since the information premium term must be zero).30 We
then move on to show that each solution to Program S is independent of the disclosure policy
employed at date 1, and it coincides with a mechanism that maximizes the sellers revenue when all
her information is commonly known. From the last observation, we conclude that no matter what
disclosure policy is employed at date 1, at every optimal mechanism given this disclosure policy,
the sellers expected revenue at each s is equal to the expected revenue of a revenue-maximizing
mechanism when s is common knowledge.31
3.2.1 Implications of Feasibility
We rst investigate consequences of incentive compatibility for buyer i; i 2 I. By the Envelope
Theorem32 we have that
@Ui(vi; si;mi)
@vi
= Pi(vi; si;mi); (2)
where Pi is bounded, so it is integrable, that is33
Ui(vi; si;mi) =
Z vi
vi(si)
Pi(ti; si;mi)dti + Ui(vi(si); si;mi); for vi 2 Vi(si): (3)
Using standard arguments (see, for instance, Myerson (1981)), we can obtain the following necessary
conditions for feasibility.
Lemma 1 If a mechanism (p; x) satises ICi; PCi and RES for all buyers i 2 I; then the following
must be true. For all i 2 I
Ui(vi(si); si;mi)  0; for all si;mi 2 Si Mi(Si)
Pi(vi; si;mi) is increasing in vi; for all si;mi 2 Si Mi(Si)
Ui(vi; si;mi) =
R vi
vi(si)
Pi(ti; si;mi)dti + Ui(vi(si); si;mi); for all vi; si;mi 2 Vi(Si) Si Mi(Si)
pi(v; s;m)  0 and i2Ipi(v; s;m)  1; for all v; s;m 2 V (S) S M(S):
We now employ Lemma 1 in order to obtain a useful rewriting of the sellers expected revenue.
In order to do so, we need a few additional pieces of notation. Let Ji(vi; si) denote the virtual
30 In other words, instead of deriving implications from the incentive compatibility constraints for the seller, we
derive a schedule that maximizes revenue for each type of the seller; and show that, is, indeed, incentive-compatible
for the seller. This is analogous to the approach in Maskin and Tirole (1990), who characterize SUPO allocations,
(Strong Unconstrained Pareto Optimal allocations). Unconstrainedrefers to the fact that the principals constraints
are not taken into account.
31Note that we are analyzing continuation equilibria at date 2 for a given disclosure policy c; which may or may
not be equilibrium-feasible, we just assume that c describes what the seller did at date 1. We establish that maximal
revenue generated at t = 2 is independent of c (even the ones that are not equilibrium-feasible).
32For general Envelope Theorems applicable here, see Milgrom and Segal (2002).
33Recall that valuation vi(si) is the lowest possible valuation for i given si:
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surplus for buyer i conditional on si. It is given by
Ji(vi; si) = vi   1  Fi(vi jsi )
fi(vi jsi ) : (4)
Let also  i(v; s;m) denote the information premium paid by buyer i; when the vector of reports is
v; s;m: It is dened by
  i(v; s;m)  ui(v; s;m) 
Z vi
vi(si)
pi(ti; v i; s;m)dti   ui(vi(si); v i; s;m): (5)
Finally, let
U i(vi(si); s;m) 
Z
V (s)
ui(vi(si); v i; s;m)f(v js)dv (6)
denote the expected payo¤ that accrues to i from the sellers perspective, given a mechanism p; x,
when his realized valuation is vi(si); and when the sellers type is s;m:
The sellers revenue when her type is s;m and she employs a mechanism (p; x); is given by:Z
V (s)
i2Ixi(v; s;m)f(v js)dv: (7)
We can rewrite revenue (7) with the help of (1) as welfare minus biddersutilities:Z
V (s)
i2I [pi(v; s;m)vi   ui(v; s;m)]f(v js)dv: (8)
Then, using (5), (8) can be rewritten as
Z
V (s)
i2I
"
pi(v; s;m)vi  
Z vi
vi(si)
pi(ti; v i; s;m)dti   ui(vi(si); v i; s;m) +  i(v; s;m)
#
f(v js)dv:
Using standard arguments (see, for example, Myerson (1981)), the above expression can be rewritten
as
Z
V (s)
i2Ipi(v; s;m)Ji(vi; si)f(v js)dv   i2IU i(vi(si); s;m) +
Z
V (s)
i2I i(v; s;m)f(v js)dv| {z }
information premium
:(9)
The rst two terms of the expression in (9) are standard. The new term is the last one, and
it consists of the sum of extra side-payments that the seller may be able to extract for selling
information to the buyers about their competitors. Even though the expression in (9) looks almost
identical to the standard one, its derivation does not rely on the coincidence of the sellers and
the buyersbeliefs, and, in addition, it does not require the seller to know anything about buyers
beliefs. Hence, the use of (5) allows us to obtain an expression of the sellers expected revenue in
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situations where the sellers and buyer is beliefs about the valuations of  i are di¤erent.34 The
corresponding result in Myerson (1981) (Lemma 3) relies on the fact that the beliefs of the seller
and the beliefs of i about  i coincide. See equation 4.10 in that paper.
We now proceed to establish a further property of incentive-compatible mechanisms for some
xed disclosure policy c. We show that, at a mechanism that is incentive-compatible for the buyers,
the ex-ante (that is before the seller observes s) expected information premium is zero.
Proposition 1 For every information disclosure policy, and every feasible mechanism, given this
disclosure policy, the ex-ante expected (from the sellers perspective) information premium incurred
by buyer i is zero, that is
s2S(s)
Z
V (s)
m2Mc(m js) i(v; s;m)f(v js)dv = 0: (10)
Proof. First, we show that for a mechanism that satises ICi for all i 2 I; it must hold that
Ev i;s i;m i [ i(v; s;m) jsi;mi ] = 0; (11)
which can be rewritten as
m i2M is i2S i
Z
V i(s i)
 i(v; s;m)
i(si) i(s i)c(m js)
i(si)s i i(s i)m ic(m js)
f i(v i js i )dv i = 0: (12)
To see this, note that, by denition, at a truth-telling equilibrium it must be the case that
Ui(vi; si;mi) = Ev i;s i;m i [ui(v; s;m) jsi;mi ] : (13)
Now, observe that (3) can be rewritten as
Ui(vi; si;mi) = Ev i;s i;m i
"Z vi
vi(si)
pi(ti; v i; s;m)dti + ui(vi(si); v i; s;m) jsi;mi
#
: (14)
Combining (13) and (14) we obtain that
Ev i;s i;m i
"
ui(v; s;m) 
Z vi
vi(si)
pi(ti; v i; s;m)dti   ui(vi(si); v i; s;m) jsi;mi
#
= 0: (15)
With the help of (5), (15) can be rewritten as Ev i;s i;m i [ i(v; s;m) jsi;mi ] = 0 establishing (12).
Now (12) is equivalent to
m i2M is i2S ii(si) i(s i)
Z
V i(s i)
 i(v; s;m)c(m js)f i(v i js i )dv i = 0
34All the arguments leading to (9) are also applicable in cases where the di¤erences in the sellers and the buyers
beliefs result from the lack of a common prior. In this paper, even though we start with a common prior that is
common knowledge, after the seller releases information, buyers may no longer know the beliefs of their competitors.
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for all vi; mi and si: Adding over all vi;mi; si we get (10).
As mentioned earlier, a disclosure policy induces discrepancies in beliefs. It may also induce
correlations in types, even in an environment where prior information is statistically independent.
From Proposition 1, we concluded that from the ex-ante perspective, irrespectively from the disclo-
sure policy, the ex-ante expected information premium is zero. Hence, exploiting the discrepancy
in beliefs, is not benecial for the seller, at least from the ex-ante perspective.
Because the  is can be interpreted as a side-payment that the seller can extract from the
buyers, Proposition 1 can be understood in the framework of the following coin-tossing example.
There are two individuals tossing two di¤erent coins. Each individual observes the outcome of his
own coin. There is a principal that observes both outcomes of the coins and discloses information
as follows. Each vector of coin outcomes is mapped to a vector of private reports - one to each
individual - about the realized outcome of the other persons coin. More specically, let Hi denote
the outcome headsof coin i, and Ti denote the outcome tailsof coin i: The principal sends to
each individual i a message about the realization of js coin for i; j = 1; 2; the messages are H^j ; T^j :
For instance, c(T^2; T^1 jH1;H2 ) denotes the probability that each agent receives the information
that the other agents coin turned out to be tails, T; when actually both coins are heads, H. The
principal o¤ers contingent payments,  is; that can depend both on the vector of the realized coin
outcomes and on the vector of messages sent to the individuals. It is relatively easy to see that if
contingent payments have positive expected value for the principal, they have negative expected
value for at least one of the agents. Hence, the only contracts willingly accepted have, at most, zero
expected value for the principal. For the same reasons as in this example, namely because there is
a common prior and agents form posterior beliefs consistent with Bayesrule, it is not possible for
the sellers information premium to have strictly positive expected value.
3.2.2 Mechanism Selection
With the implications of the feasibility constraints in hand, we now move on to analyze the mech-
anism selection stage for a given disclosure policy c. We proceed as follows. We ignore the sellers
constraints and examine mechanisms that maximize the sellers expected revenue for each of her
types - that is, for each couple s;m subject to the resource and the constraints for the buyers: We
break this problem in two steps: First, we examine what mechanisms maximize the rst two terms
of (9), and then we examine what is the highest feasible possible value for the third term. The
problem of maximizing the rst two terms of (9) is called Program S; and it is given by:
maxp
Z
V (s)
i2Ipi(v; s;m)Ji(vi; si)f(v js)dv   i2IU i(vi(si); s;m)
subject to :
(RES) pi(v; s;m)  0 and i2Ipi(v; s;m)  1 for v; s;m 2 V (S) S M(S)
(IC) Pi(vi; si;mi) increasing in vi, for all si;mi 2 Si Mi(Si) and all i 2 I
(PC) U i(vi(si); s;m)  0 for all s;m 2 S M(S) and all i 2 I
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The rst set of constraints of Program S are resource constraints; the second and third sets are
necessary conditions for incentive compatibility and the participation constraints for the buyers.
A solution of Program S gives an allocation rule p from which we obtain the payment rule using
xi (v; s;m) = p

i (v; s;m)vi 
R vi
vi(si)
pi (ti; v i; s;m)dti: In the steps below, when we refer to a solution
of Program S; we ignore the term  i2IU i(vi(si); s;m) since it turns out to be zero at an optimum.
We rst establish that a solution of Program S is a feasible choice for the seller, given c:
Lemma 2 A solution p; x of Program S; given some disclosure policy c; is feasible for the sellers
mechanism selection game at date 2.
Proof. Given that p; x is a solution of Program S for each s;m; it satises resource constraints,
as well as all the constraints for the buyers. Now, it is easy to see that it satises the participation
constraints of the seller, since the seller can always guarantee zero by not assigning the objects
and not charging anything. Hence, the value of Program S is positive for each s;m: Then, we just
need to establish incentive compatibility for the seller. This is also immediate, since p; x solves
Program S for each s;m; which implies that, by misreporting, the seller can select only a schedule
that maximizes a wrong objective function.
We now use Proposition 1 and Lemma 2 to establish that, at a solution of our informed seller
problem, it must hold that
R
V (s)  i(v; s;m)f(v js)dv = 0 for all i 2 I and all s;m 2 S M(S):
Proposition 2 Given any disclosure policy, at a solution of our informed seller problem, it must
hold that i2I
R
V (s)  i(v; s;m)f(v js)dv = 0 for all i 2 I and all s;m 2 S M(S):
Proof. Let p; x denote a solution for our informed seller, given some disclosure policy c: From (10)
it follows that if for some s;m 2 S M(S) we have that i2I
R
V (s)  i(v; s;m)f(v js)dv > 0; then,
there exists another s^; m^ 2 S M(S) with
i2I
Z
V (s)
 i(v; s^; m^)f(v js)dv < 0: (16)
From Lemma 2, we know that p; x is feasible for the informed seller, given c. Then, if p; x
is a solution to the informed seller problem for c; then it must be the case that for each s;m; the
sellers revenue at p; x is as least as high as at p; x for all s;m: For type s^; m^; this implies thatZ
V (s)
i2Ipi(v; s^; m^)Ji(vi; si)f(v js)dv   i2IU i(s^; m^) +
Z
V (s)
i2I i(v; s^; m^)f(v js)dv

Z
V (s)
i2Ipi (v; s^; m^)Ji(vi; si)f(v js)dv: (17)
(Each type of seller has the option of using p; x; irrespective of the disclosure policy.) But because
p solves Program S; it satisesZ
V (s)
i2Ipi (v; s^; m^)Ji(vi; si)f(v js)dv 
Z
V (s)
i2Ipi(v; s^; m^)Ji(vi; si)f(v js)dv i2IU i(vi(si); s^; m^);
(18)
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which together with (16) contradicts (17).
This Proposition tells us that the best that the seller can hope for is a mechanism where for
each s;m it solves Program S:
A solution of Program S may depend on the disclosure policy, because it a¤ects buyersbeliefs,
which, in turn, determine the set of incentive-compatible assignment rules. We now establish that,
irrespective of the disclosure policy, a solution of Program S, p; x coincides with a mechanism
chosen by the seller when s is commonly known; call it ps; xs; that is
p(v; s;m) = ps(v) (19)
x(v; s;m) = xs(v):
Remark 1 In what follows, we are assuming that for all i 2 I; Ji(vi; si) = vi   1 Fi(vijsi )fi(vijsi ) is
strictly increasing in vi: If not, we can replace each Ji with an appropriately constructed increasing
function J^i (this procedure is sometimes referred to as ironing35) and proceed exactly along the
lines described in Myerson (1981).36
Proposition 3 For each s; a solution of Program S is independent from the disclosure policy,
and it coincides with a solution of the sellers problem when s is common knowledge. Moreover,
it is feasible for the sellers mechanism selection game at date 2, no matter the disclosure policy
employed at date 1:
Proof. The expression i2Ipi(v; s;m)Ji(vi; si) is maximized pointwise - that is, for each vector
(v; s;m)  by setting
pi (v; s;m) = 1 if Ji(vi; si)  Jj(vj ; sj); all j 6= i and Ji(vi; si)  0 (20)
pi (v; s;m) = 0, otherwise.
In the case of ties, the object is awarded to the lowest index buyer among the ones who tie.
From (20) it also immediately follows that p coincides with the assignment rule that the seller
would choose when s is common knowledge; hence, (19) holds.
We now proceed to establish that p; x is feasible for the seller and for the buyers for every
disclosure policy.
First, we argue that p; x satises the buyersconstraints irrespective of the disclosure policy.
This is because, pi (v; s;m) is increasing in vi for all v i; s;m, implying that p
; x is dominant
strategy incentive-compatible. Moreover, since ui(vi(si); v i; s;m) = 0 for all v i; s;m and all
i 2 I it satises the participation constraints irrespective of the buyersbeliefs, which are what the
35The ironed virtual valuation is obtained in essentially three steps: First, we integrate the virtual valuation; second
we convexify this integral by nding the highestconvex function that lies (weakly) below the integral; and, nally,
we di¤erentiate the convexied integral. The function obtained in this way is increasing because it is the derivative
of a convex function and often referred to as the ironedvirtual valuation.
36As is shown, in Skreta (2007), we can iron virtual surpluses also in environments where fi fails to be continuous
and strictly positive.
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disclosure policy a¤ects. Now, to see that p; x is feasible for the seller irrespective of the disclosure
policy, notice that the objective function of Program S does not depend on the disclosure policy
employed at date 1. Also, from (19) one can see that p; x; is independent from m; and hence
from the disclosure policy. Therefore, p; x is feasible for the sellers mechanism selection game at
date 2, no matter the disclosure policy employed at date 1:
With this result in hand, we are now ready to state and prove our information irrelevance
theorem:
Theorem 1 Fix a disclosure policy. At every optimal mechanism given this disclosure policy,
the sellers expected revenue at each s is equal to the expected revenue of a revenue-maximizing
mechanism when s is common knowledge.
Proof. This theorem follows from Propositions 2 and 3. In Proposition 2, we concluded that
the best that the seller can hope for is a mechanism where for each s;m; it solves Program S:
Proposition 3 then established that a solution of Program S is independent from the disclosure
policy, and it coincides with a solution of the sellers problem when s is common knowledge. It
also established that it is feasible for the sellers mechanism selection game at date 2, no matter
the disclosure policy employed at date 1:
Now, let us o¤er a few connections between our nding and the earlier literature on informed
principal. Because p; x satises the incentive constraints for the seller when the buyers know the
sellers type (since we showed that it is feasible, irrespective of the disclosure policy), it is safe in
the terminology of Myerson (1983). By construction, it is also interim-e¢ cient (SUPO37 in the
terminology of Maskin and Tirole (1990)), thus, it is a strong solution, in the sense of Myerson
(1983). As argued in the works of Maskin and Tirole (1990 and 1992), strong solutions are equilibria
of the three-stage mechanism selection game, and they survive all common rening criteria.
3.2.3 Discussion
We have established an information irrelevance result. For every disclosure policy, a revenue-
maximizing mechanism chosen by the informed seller must generate at each s;m exactly the same
revenue that is generated by the mechanism that is optimal when s is commonly known. This is
despite the fact that the seller can use her private information to create correlations in the buyers
types.
We now highlight the forces behind our result. We discuss which of the them are present in
more general mechanism design problems where, for instance, values can be interdependent or
common, and, which ones are more specic to this standard independent private value scenario.
37An allocation is SUPO, from the point of view of di¤erent types of the principal for given beliefs (of the agent),
if there exists no other feasible allocation, (satisfying the constraints for the agent), even for di¤erent beliefs, that
Pareto dominates it, (Maskin and Tirole (1990)).
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The key forces of the result are three. First, disclosure policies, irrespective of how sophisticated
they are, do not eliminate information rents. Second, the sellers incentive constraints are not
binding. And, third, when looking at the relaxed program for the seller, namely Program S; its
solution is dominant-strategy incentive-compatible. As we discuss below, the rst two forces are
present in more general mechanism design problems; however, the last one is more particular to
this simple independent private value problem.
Disclosure Policies Create Correlation in Types, but do not Eliminate Informa-
tion Rents: From our analysis, it follows that information-disclosure policies do not a¤ect the
information rents that each type of buyer enjoys and that are always equal to the ones obtained
when the sellers information is fully disclosed. Buyer is expected payo¤, given a disclosure pol-
icy c and a mechanism that is incentive compatible given c, is given (3). From (3) we have
that Ui(vi; si;mi)  0; for all vi 2 Vi(si): Moreover, if vmini (si) is the lowest type for which
Pi(ti; si;mi) > 0; then for vi 2 [vmini (si); vi(si)] we have that Ui(vi; si;mi) > 0. Therefore, ir-
respective of the sophistication of the sellers information-disclosure policies, for types that receive
the object with strictly positive probability, full surplus extraction from buyer is perspective is not
possible, unless he has no private information, which can happen when si fully reveals is valuation
to the seller. This observation may sound a bit surprising since, for most information-disclosure
policies, buyerstypes become correlated. However, full surplus extraction is impossible because
more than one payo¤-relevant types have the same beliefs. Here, the set of payo¤-relevant types,
that is the vis; that are associated with the same probability distribution over belief-relevant parts,
namely si;mi; belong in the set Vi(si) = [vi(si); vi(si)]: Then, irrespective of the disclosure policy,
all vis in Vi(si) can mimic each other exactly as in the case where si was commonly known. Hence,
the expected information rent is
R vi
vi(si)
Pi(ti; si;mi)dti + Ui(vi(si); si;mi): This was rst observed
by Zvika Neeman (2004).
However, this observation, on its own, does not immediately imply that disclosure policies do not
a¤ect information rents. The reason is that expected information rent in (3) is calculated with is
beliefs and these beliefs may di¤er from the sellers. What is relevant for the sellers is how often
ui(v; s;m) >
R vi
vi(si)
pi(ti; v i; s;m)dti+ui(vi(si); v i; s;m) versus the reverse, from her perspective.
In the rst part of the proof of Proposition 1, we established that, from a buyers perspective, the
expected di¤erence, (slack), of ui(v; s;m) and
R vi
vi(si)
pi(ti; v i; s;m)dti+ui(vi(si); v i; s;m), namely
the  i(v; s;m); must be zero. We then proceeded to establish that the same is true from the sellers
perspective. From these considerations, it follows that, irrespective of the disclosure policy the
expected slack is always the same and equal to zero. This result is due to the fact that we are
in a consistent model with a common prior, and buyers form beliefs according to Bayesrule. This
feature will be also present in all models where there is a common prior and initial information is
statistically independent, irrespective of whether values are private or interdependent.
The Sellers Constraints are Not Binding: From our analysis, it became clear that the
sellers incentive constraints were not binding. This feature is due to the fact that the information
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that the seller has is semi-private, in the sense that it is not exclusive, (remember that buyer i knows
the signal that the seller has about himself). This force is present in more general mechanism design
problems, such as the ones that we consider in the next section.
Disclosure Policies do not A¤ect the Value of Program S : The reason behind this
result is that in this baseline IPV model, a solution of Program S is dominant-strategy incentive-
compatible.38 However, it is not true in more general mechanism design problems. This last reason
is what makes all information-disclosure policies equivalent in the environment we have examined
so far. As we show in the next section, in more general mechanism design problems, information
disclosure policies may matter, because they a¤ect the set of incentive-compatible mechanisms,
which, in turn, a¤ect the value of Program S: For those cases we show that the value of Program
S is maximized when the seller discloses no information at all.
4. General Environment: Interdependent Values, Non-linear Payoffs, Multiple
Goods.
Here, we examine revenue-maximizing mechanisms in more general environments that allow for
interdependent or common values and for multiple objects. There is a risk-neutral seller who faces
I risk-neutral buyers. Let Z denote the set of allocations - that is, the set of all possible assignments
of the good(s):39 Both Z and I are nite natural numbers. Buyer is payo¤ from allocation z is
denoted by uzi (vi; v i); and it depends on vi; and on the valuations of all the other buyers v i. This
formulation allows for values to be private, interdependent, or purely common. We assume that, for
all i 2 I, uzi (; v i) is increasing, convex and di¤erentiable for each z and v i:40 A buyers payo¤
from not participating in the mechanism is taken to be zero. We also normalize the sellers payo¤
from all z 2 Z to be zero.
As in the baseline model, the vis are statistically independent from one another. Also, the
structure of the signals that the seller observes and the denition of the disclosure policy are all
as in the baseline model. For the same reasons as there, we appeal to the revelation and the
inscrutability principles.
We need to adjust the denition of direct revelation mechanisms only slightly. Here, the assign-
ment rule p : V (S)  S M(S)  ! (Z) species the probability of each allocation for a given
vector of reports. We denote by pz(v; s;m) the probability that allocation z is implemented when
38This feature is not unique to this problem. Mookherjee and Reichelstein (1992) describe environments where an
optimal Bayesian incentive-compatible mechanism is dominant strategy incentive-compatible.
39 In the case that the seller has 1  N < 1 objects for sale, an allocation z is an assignment of the objects to
the buyers and to the seller. It is a vector with N components, where each component stands for an object and
it species who gets it; therefore, the set of possible allocations is nite, and given by Z  [I [ f0g]N . Note that
the formulation is very exible and allows for the goods to be heterogeneous, substitutes for some buyers, whereas
complements for other buyers and for externalities.
40This model shares common features to the one considered by Figueroa and Skreta (2007).
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the vector of reports is v; s;m.
With some abuse of notation, we now let ui(v; s;m) = z2Zpz(v; s;m)uzi (vi; v i)   xi(v; s;m);
and Ui(vi; si;mi) = max
v0i
Ev i;s i;m i [z2Zpz(v0i; v i; s;m)u
z
i (vi; v i) xi(v0i; v i; s;m) jsi;mi ]; stand
for their analogs in this more general environment. Notice that Ui(vi; si;mi) is convex, since it is
a maximum of convex functions.
The statements of the constraints for the seller and the buyers are analogous to the standard
IPV model. Then, by using similar arguments as there, one can establish a result parallel to
Lemma 1. In the present context, the incentive constraints translate into the requirement that the
derivative of Ui; namely,
Pi(vi; si;mi)  Ev i;s i;m i [z2Zpz(v; s;m)
@uzi (vi; v i)
@vi
jsi;mi ]; (21)
evaluated at the true type is weakly increasing.41
Similarly, as in the baseline model, we dene virtual surpluses. This concept is now allocation-
specic, because an allocation may be a¤ecting all buyers, and it is given by
Jz(v; s)  i2I

uzi (vi; v i) 
1  Fi(vi jsi )
fi(vi jsi )
@uzi (vi; v i)
@vi

:
The sellers revenue, when her type is s;m, is given by
R
V (s)i2Ixi(v; s;m)f(v js)dv, which by
using similar arguments as in the baseline case, can be rewritten as
Z
V (s)
z2Zpz(v; s;m)Jz(v; s)f(v js)dv   i2IU i(vi(si); s;m) +
Z
V (s)
i2I i(v; s;m)f(v js)dv| {z }
expected information premium
;
(22)
where, here,  i(v; s;m) and U i(vi(si); s;m) stand for the analogs of (5) and (6), which are given
by   i(v; s;m)  ui(v; s;m)  
R vi
vi(si)
z2Zpz(ti; v i; s;m)
@uzi (ti;v i)
@vi
dti   ui(vi(si); v i; s;m) and
U i(vi(si); s;m) 
R
V (s) ui(vi(si); v i; s;m)f(v js)dv:
As in the baseline case, we analyze the mechanism-selection stage for a given disclosure policy
as follows. We ignore the sellers constraints and examine mechanisms that maximize the sellers
expected revenue for each of her types - that is, for each couple s;m subject to the resource and
the constraints for the buyers: Again, we break this problem in two steps: First, we examine which
mechanisms maximize the rst two terms of (22), and then we examine what is the highest feasible
possible value for the third term. The problem of maximizing the rst two terms of (22) is called
Program SG; and it is given by:
maxp
Z
V (s)
z2Zpz(v; s;m)Jz(v; s)f(v js)dv   i2IU i(vi(si); s;m) (23)
(RES) pi(v; s;m)  0 and i2Ipi(v; s;m)  1 for v; s;m 2 V (S) S M(S)
(IC) Pi(vi; si;mi) increasing in vi, for all si;mi 2 Si Mi(Si) and all i 2 I
(PC) U i(vi(si); s;m)  0 for all s;m 2 S M(S) and all i 2 I
41More precisely, this holds for a selection from its subgradient, which is single-valued almost surely.
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Notice that Proposition 1 applies directly to this more general environment. The same is true
for Lemma 2 and Proposition 2. This can be easily seen by going through their corresponding proofs
and by replacing
R
V (s)i2Ipi(v; s;m)Ji(vi; si)f(v js)dv with
R
V (s)z2Zpz(v; s;m)Jz(v; s)f(v js)dv.
Hence, even in this more general problem, at a solution of the mechanism selection game at date
2, the information premium for each type of the seller is zero, and the best that each type of the
seller can achieve is a mechanism that solves Program SG: The only di¤erence from the standard
IPV case, is that solutions of Program SG typically depend on the disclosure policy.
If the value of Program SG is independent of the disclosure policy, then it is straightforward
to see that our information irrelevance Theorem applies. Now, an important question is: When is
the value of Program SG independent of the disclosure policy? A class of situations where this is
true, is when its solution is dominant strategy incentive-compatible.42 This was the situation in the
standard independent private-value model we examined previously. But there can be situations,
where the value of Program SG is independent of the disclosure policy, however its solution is
not dominant strategy incentive- compatible.43 In general, however, the value of Program SG
does depend on the disclosure policies. This can happen even in a private value setup, as well as in
richerproblems with interdependent values, multiple goods, complementarities, externalities, etc.
In Appendix B, we present an example where the value of Program SG depends on the disclosure
policy in a private-value setting.
When the value of Program SG depends of the disclosure policy, the question that naturally
arises is which disclosure policy is best. We show that the value of Program SG is maximized when
the seller discloses no information. The reason is that any mechanism that is incentive-compatible
under any alternative disclosure policy, is also incentive-compatible under the no information
disclosurepolicy.
Proposition 4 All mechanisms that are feasible for Program SG under every disclosure policy,
are also feasible for Program SG under the no informationdisclosure policy; hence, the value of
Program SG is maximized under theno informationdisclosure policy.
From Proposition 4, it follows that the value of Program SG is maximized when the seller
discloses no information. We call this disclosure policy c: The intuition for this result is that more
42The solution of Program SG is dominant strategy incentive-compatible if the following is true: If z1,z2 2 Z are
any two allocations such that, for a given realization of valuations (vi; v i); we have z1 2 argmax
z2Z
Jz(v
 
i ; v i) and
z2 2 argmax
z2Z
Jz(v
+
i ; v i) (the notation v
 
i means limit from the left to vi and v
+
i means limit from the right to vi)
then it holds that for all v i
@uz2i (vi; v i)
@vi
 @u
z1
i (vi; v i)
@vi
:
These conditions are quite stringent, but they are only necessary and not su¢ cient conditions for Program SG to
have a solution that is dominant strategy incentive-compatible. An easy way to see that they are not su¢ cient is
to consider the standard independent private-value model when virtual valuations fail to be monotonic. In such
cases, it is possible that the conditions we state are violated, but the optimal auction is still dominant strategy
incentive-compatible.
43An example where this occurs is available from the author upon request.
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information makes more deviations for the buyers feasible, making, in some sense, the incentive
constraints harder to satisfy. This idea is also discussed in Myerson (1986).
Suppose that the seller uses c, and let p(:; s); x(:; s) denote a solution of Program SG; when
the sellers information is s:44 In the Theorem that follows, we establish that the mechanism p; x;
where for each s it is equal to p(:; s); x(:; s); is a solution to our informed sellers problem.
Theorem 2 In the general case, an informed seller maximizes revenue by disclosing no informa-
tion, and by employing a mechanism p; x; where for each s it solves Program SG given this
disclosure policy:
Proof. Given that the value of Program SG is maximal under the no information disclosure policy,
c; we now argue that the mechanism p; x is a solution to our informed seller problem.
At date 1, the seller discloses no information. At date 2, stage one, the seller proposes p; x
and at stage two, the buyers accept or reject p; x: And, nally, at stage three, the buyers and
the seller report their types truthfully. To see that p; x is an equilibrium mechanism of this game,
note that given that p; x satises IC for both the buyers and the seller, they nd it optimal to
reveal their information truthfully at stage three. Also, since p; x satises PC for the buyers,
they all nd it optimal to participate at stage 2. Now, at stage 1, suppose that the seller proposes
an out-of-equilibrium mechanism: No matter what the buyers may infer from that, the alternative
schedule cannot be strictly better than p; x; no matter which types choose to deviate: This is
because p; x (given beliefs determined by the no information disclosure policy) gives the type-s
seller the highest expected revenue that she can hope for. Hence, no alternative ~p; ~x makes the
type-s seller strictly better-o¤ than p; x: Therefore, p; x is an equilibrium allocation.
In terms of comparison with the earlier literature on informed principal, note that the allocation
induced by the mechanism p; x is SUPO in the terminology of Maskin and Tirole (1990). It
is UPO for the beliefs equal to the prior,45 and there is no other UPO, even for other posterior
beliefs, that is better than p; x: Note, however, that p; x need not be the only solution of
Program SG; given the no information disclosure policy. When there is more than one solution, all
of them are SUPO. We close in the next section with a few concluding remarks.
5. Concluding Remarks
This paper studies revenue-maximizing auctions by an informed seller. The seller has information
about various buyers that is not known to all buyers participating in the auction. Before the
auction, the seller can disclose any amount of information she sees t. After disclosing information,
the seller chooses a revenue-maximizing mechanism. At that point, we have an informed seller
problem.
44We remove the argument of m from p; x because the vector v; s summarizes all relevant information, when
the seller discloses no information.
45These are the beliefs of the buyers at phase two, after the seller discloses no information at phase one.
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For the classical single-object independent private-values environment, we establish an information-
irrelevance theorem. The release of information correlated with buyersvaluations has no e¤ect on
the expected revenue generated by a revenue-maximizing mechanism. This is despite the fact that
the seller can create correlation in types. In more general private-value or interdependent-value
environments, however, information disclosure matters. There, we establish that, in general, the
best that the seller can do is to disclose no information at all.
Our ndings extend in a straightforward manner to a number of other mechanism-design prob-
lems. If the interest is in designing e¢ cient, instead of revenue-maximizing, mechanisms, then the
previous analysis can be very easily modied. All that one needs to do, is to replace virtual sur-
pluses with actual surpluses. For mechanism-design problems with multidimensional types, nding
the optimal information-disclosure policy is not harder than nding the optimal disclosure policy
for single dimensional types. All the steps described in the proof of Proposition 4 go through in
this case, as well. However, solving the analog of Program SG in a multidimensional setting can be
extremely di¢ cult.
Suppose as we have so far, that the information that the seller observes about the buyers is
statistically independent across them, but now, the ex-ante information of the buyers is statistically
correlated. Then, when the conditions of Cremer and McLean (1988), or of McAfee and Reny (1992)
are satised, the seller can extract full surplus, exactly as in those papers, so there is no further
scope for information disclosure. If types consist of a payo¤-relevant part, and a belief-relevant
part, as in the work of Neeman (2004), and Heifetz and Neeman (2006), our results go through
in the following sense. The correlation in the prior information can be exploited using Cremer-
McLeantype of lotteries, to infer the buyersvaluations. When beliefs are part of types, however,
the inference will typically not be perfect, so instead of learning the buyers valuations, as in CM,
the seller will have a sharper estimate of where they lie. After that initial step, we are essentially
back to the case of statistically independent private information, with the priors replaced by the
posteriors.
Finally, for the cases where the buyersprior information is statistically independent, but the
seller observes information that is statistically correlated across buyers, we conjecture that the
seller will be able to use this information to her advantage, even in the baseline IPV case and, of
course, in the case of interdependent values. The reason is that, there, the release of information
can create correlation in the payo¤-relevant part of the buyerstypes, thus enabling the seller to
use Cremer-McLeantype of lotteries to extract more surplus from the buyers.
The main message of our analysis is that for a seller who has the power to choose the rules of
trade based on the information that she has, sophisticated disclosure policies do not pay. Simply
revealing nothing is optimal. In some special cases such as the classical independent private value
paradigm, our information irrelevance result allows us to conclude that anything between no and
full information disclosure is optimal. It would be interesting to investigate these questions within
the framework of particular auction mechanisms. We leave this for future work.
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6. Appendix A: Omitted Proofs
Proof of Proposition 4
Take a disclosure policy c and let p(v;m; x) and x(v;m; x) denote an optimal mechanism, given
this disclosure policy. We show that if this mechanism is incentive-compatible, given c; it is also
incentive-compatible when the seller discloses no information at all. If p(v;m; x) and x(v;m; x) is
incentive-compatible, given c; then it must be the case that
Pi(vi;mi; si) = Ev i;s i;m i

z2Zpz(v; s;m)
@uzi (vi; v i)
@vi
jmi; si

(24)
is increasing in vi for each mi; si:
When the seller discloses no information, then Pi(vi; si) = Ev i;s i
h
z2Zpz(v; s)
@uzi (vi;v i)
@vi
jsi
i
:
We now show that irrespective of the information disclosure policy, it holds that
Pi(vi; si) = miprob(mi jsi )P (vi;mi; si): (25)
Observe that Pi(vi; si); and Pi(vi;mi; si) can be written, respectively, as
Pi(vi; si) = s i2S i(s i)
Z
V i(s i)
z2Zpz(v; s)
@uzi (vi; v i)
@vi
f i(v i js i )dv i
and
Pi(vi;mi; si) = m i2M is i2S i
Z
V i(s i)
z2Zpz(v; s;m)
@uzi (v)
@vi
f i(v i js i )(si)(s i)c(m js)
(si)s i i(s i)m ic(m js)
dv i:
Dene pz(v; s) = m2Mpz(v; s;m)c(m js): Then, (25) follows from the following considerations:
miprob(mi jsi )  P (vi;mi; si)
= mi

s i i(s i)m ici(m js)
  m is i Z
V i(s i)
z2Zpz(v; s;m)
@uzi (v)
@vi
f i(v i js i ) i(s i)c(m js)
s i i(s i)m ic(m js)
dv i
= mim i2M is i2S i
Z
V i(s i)
 i(s i)c(m js)z2Zpz(v; s;m)@u
z
i (v)
@vi
f i(v i js i )dv i
= s i2S i i(s i)
Z
V i(s i)
z2Zm2Mpz(v; s;m)c(m js)@u
z
i (v)
@vi
f i(v i js i )dv i
= s i2S i i(s i)
Z
V i(s i)
z2Zpz(v; s)
@uzi (v)
@vi
f i(v i js i )dv i
= Pi(vi; si):
Now, from (24), we know that P (vi;mi; si) is increasing in vi for each mi;and si: Then, from (25),
we can immediately conclude that Pi(vi; si) is increasing in vi for each si, which implies that the
given mechanism is also incentive-compatible for the no information disclosure policy.
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7. Appendix B: An Example where the Value of Program SG depends on the
Disclosure Policy
Below, we describe an example that belongs in the private-values class and where the sellers revenue
at the optimal mechanism (as well as the optimal mechanism) depends on the disclosure policy that
she employs. This example illustrates how the no disclosure policy increases the sellers revenue by
relaxing the incentive constraints. Its solution uses the technique described in Figueroa and Skreta
(2007b). The reader interested in the full details behind the procedure used here is referred to that
paper.46
There are two buyers, 1 and 2, and two allocations, zA and zB: Buyer 1s valuation, v1; is
distributed uniformly on the interval [0; 1]; and his payo¤s from these two allocations are given by,
respectively:
uzA1 (v1) = v
2
1 + 0:37; u
zB
1 (v1) = v
5
1 + 0:2 for v1 2 [0; 1];
which are both convex and increasing in v1.
Buyer 2s valuation, v2; is either 0 or 0.5 with equal probability, and his payo¤s from allocations
zA and zB are given by, respectively:
uzA2 (0) = 0 and u
zB
2 (0) = 0
uzA2 (0:5) = 0:2 and u
zB
2 (0:5) = 0:
As can be readily veried from the buyerspayo¤ functions, this example falls within the private-
value class, since no buyers payo¤ depends on the valuation parameter of the other buyer.
The virtual utilities of allocations zA and zB are given by, respectively:
JzA(v1; 0) = 3v
2
1   2v1 + 0:37 and JzB (v1; 0) = 6v51   5v41 + 0:2
JzA(v1; 0:5) = 3v
2
1   2v1 + 0:57 and JzB (v1; 0:5) = 6v51   5v41 + 0:2:
The seller observes a signal perfectly correlated with buyer 2s valuation, in other words, the seller
learns 2s valuation. We consider the design of optimal auctions under two alternative disclosure
policies: full and no information disclosure.
Case 1: Optimal Mechanism under Full Disclosure (FD)
The solution under full disclosure is as follows. When v2 = 0:5; the seller assigns probability
one to allocation zA; irrespective of the value of v1. This is because, as can be easily veried from
46Also, a fairly detailed account of the missing steps of the solution for this example, can be downloaded from the
authors website.
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Figure 2, the virtual surplus of allocation zA is greater than the one of allocation zB for all values
of v1:
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This assignment rule is feasible because when the seller assigns probability one to zA; then (21) for
buyer 1 reduces to
P1(v1; 0:5; 0:5) =
duzA1 (v1)
dv1
 P zA(v1) = 2v1;
which is increasing in v1:
When v2 = 0; the solution is derived as follows. First, let us the depict the virtual surpluses of
allocations zA and zB :
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The crossings of JzA and JzB occur at ~v1 = 0:100 32 and v^1 = 0:470 64:
When v2 = 0 pointwise optimization of47
max
(p;x)
Z
[0;1]
[pzA(v1; 0)JzA(v1; 0) + pzB (v1; 0)JzB (v1; 0)] dv
does not lead to a feasible mechanism. As we can see from Figure 3, pointwise optimization
dictates to assign probability one to allocation zA for v < 0:100 32 and to assign probability one
to allocation zB for v in the interval [0:100 32; 0:470 64]: However, it is not possible to switch from
allocation zA to allocation zB because this would imply that P1 falls at 0:100 32 since, as can be
seen in Figure 4, P zA(v) > P zB (v) for all v 2 (0; 0:737]; where P zA(v1) = du
zA
1 (v1)
dv1
= 2v1; and
P zB (v1) =
du
zB
1 (v1)
dv1
= 5v41:
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Following, the solution approach developed in Figueroa and Skreta (2007b), we search for the
best region of compromise [x; x] where the seller randomizes between zA and zB in such a way so
as to minimize the loss from assigning positive weight to a sub-optimal allocation, while preserving
incentive compatibility.
In the case of full disclosure, we nd that the region of compromise is
[xFD; xFD] = [0:0252; 0:3169] (26)
47 In what follows, we suppress the arguments s and m from the assignment rule, as they can be readily understood
from the context, given the simplicity of the disclosure policies that we consider in this example.
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and the optimal assignment rule is:
pFD(v1; 0) = (1; 0) for v1 2 [0; 0:0252) (27)
pFD(v1; 0) = (
0:050 4  5v41
2v   5v41
; 1  0:050 4  5v
4
1
2v   5v41
) for v1 2 [0:0252; 0:3169)
pFD(v1; 0) = (0; 1) for v1 2 [0:3169; 0:47064]
pFD(v1; 0) = (1; 0) for v1 2 (0:47064; 1];
which is incentive-compatible by construction. The sellers expected revenue in the case of full
disclosure is
RevenueFD = 0:393 96:
Case 2: Optimal Mechanism under No Disclosure
In this case, buyer 1 does not know whether v2 = 0 or v2 = 0:5:
When v2 = 0:5; the optimal assignment is exactly as in the case of full disclosure - namely,
the seller assigns probability one to allocation zA; and it is feasible for exactly the same reasons as
before.
When v2 = 0; as before, we are looking for a region [x; x] where the seller sacrices revenue by
assigning positive weight also to the allocation that does not have the highest virtual valuation.
The only di¤erence from the case of full disclosure is that, now, buyer 1 does not know v2; so
he is not sure what the optimal assignment is as a function of his report. This uncertainty relaxes
the incentive compatibility constraints. For the case of no information disclosure, the region of
compromise is
[xND; xND] = [0:07; 0:1391]; (28)
which is smaller than the region of compromise under full disclosure described in (26).
The optimal assignment rule for this case is given by:
pND(v1; 0) = (1; 0) for v1 2 [0; 0:07) (29)
pND(v1; 0) = (
0:28  2v1   5v41
(2v1   5v41)
; 1  0:28  2v1   5v
4
1
(2v1   5v41)
) for v1 2 [0:07; 0:1391)
pND(v1; 0) = (0; 1) for v1 2 [0:1391; 0:47064]
pND(v1; 0) = (1; 0) for v1 2 (0:47064; 1];
which is incentive-compatible by construction. The sellers expected revenue in the case of no
information disclosure is
RevenueND = 0:402 51:
Comparing the sellers revenue under full and no information disclosure, we see that
RevenueND > RevenueFD:
Hence, we conclude that in this private-value setup information-disclosure policies a¤ect the revenue
generated by the optimal mechanism.
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